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Abstract
In 2013 China launched what is now known as the Belt and Road Initiative. This
multinational, trillion-dollar development project seeks to improve connections by land and sea
between China and its economic partners in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Since its
launch, many countries have warned that Belt and Road is a thinly-veiled plot for China to
advance its geopolitical and military interests. This paper uses Pakistan and Kenya as case
studies to assess claims that China is using “debt-trap diplomacy” to accomplish its foreign
policy agenda. Using a qualitative and holistic approach, this paper finds that contrary to popular
arguments among Western politicians and journalists, most recipient countries are eager to
receive Belt and Road investment, and the Initiative has not shown itself to serve China’s
military interests. Rather, this paper finds a growing global interest in following Beijing’s
models for development and economic growth, despite warnings from the United States and
other Western nations.
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Introduction

Usually the crowds bustling through the tunnels within Hong Kong metro stations are so
intense that one feels as if she is carried to the platform merely by the force of people around her.
Yet by eleven o’clock at night, portions of the system begin to close for the night, and for the
first time since the early morning hours, Hong Kong’s fast-paced throngs are forced to stay
above ground. In these moments before the trains stop running for the night, you can finally walk
through the brightly-lit tunnels leisurely. Slowly enough to notice the advertisements lining the
walls: shiny, digitally altered photos of trains running at lightning speed. Below a phrase in
Cantonese, the ad says in English: “The Belt and Road Initiative: Connecting the Future.” Soon
enough, you will start noticing these posters everywhere; in the airport, on the TVs playing the
news within the subway cars, and on billboards lining the highways in Beijing and Shanghai.
The message is loud and clear, this Belt and Road Initiative is China’s newest, shimmering
export.
In 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping, speaking at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan
proposed an ambitious plan to rebuild the ancient silk trade routes that had once connected the
entire Eurasian continent. The plan would be called One Belt One Road—and was later
rebranded as the Belt and Road Initiative. Four years later President Xi gave a triumphant speech
at the opening of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. He called Belt and
Road the “project of the century” and promised that after a “first courageous step towards each
other, we can embark on a path leading to friendship, shared development, peace, harmony and a
better future.”1 He claimed that already the Belt and Road Initiative had begun to improve

1

“Full text of President Xi's speech at opening of Belt and Road forum.” Xinhua, May 14, 2017.
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm. Accessed: December 10, 2018.
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financial, infrastructure, policy, trade, and people-to-people connectivity between the receiving
countries. Questions over the validity of these claims is only a small part of why Belt and Road
has commanded global scrutiny.
The Belt and Road Initiative is not only remarkable for its breadth and ambition, it also
represents the next stage in China’s political and economic opening-up to the world. Through
Belt and Road, China is forcing the international community to recognize it as a major force in
international development. According to Xi and the Chinese leadership, the Initiative promises to
rewrite longstanding rules for international development and investment in countries that have
been historically overlooked.
To its skeptics, Belt and Road is a thinly-veiled plot to exert influence and to challenge
the United States as global hegemon. Yet any argument declaring its success or failure is
necessarily based in large part on speculation. After all, the initiative is only five years old and
many details are highly contested. Though China reports that over 70 countries have signed onto
the project, it is more difficult to determine where work has actually commenced, or what the
ultimate impact of the projects will be on their host countries. This paper seeks to challenge the
conflicting views that have emerged in the international media between classifying the Belt and
Road Initiative as either a generous and lucrative economic development project or a neocolonial
strategy to gain geopolitical power. Using a qualitative and holistic approach, this paper will use
the Belt and Road Initiative’s projects in Kenya and Pakistan as cases to begin to understand the
economic and geopolitical impact of BRI on both China and recipient countries. Going forward,
the Belt and Road Initiative may be referred to as “Belt and Road, the “Initiative,” and “BRI.”
Additionally, dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars, unless otherwise noted.

5

This paper will be interesting for a wide range of audiences beyond those interested in
contemporary Chinese politics. Political theorists should recognize that analyzing Belt and Road
provides an opportunity to contribute to broader questions concerning the future of economic
statecraft. The BRI adds a new piece of evidence to debates concerning the existence of a
“Beijing Consensus” and China’s ambitions for economic statecraft. Before the BRI’s inception,
the principal questions in academic circles was why the China Model for economic development
worked so well for China and whether it could be replicated in other developing countries with
similar success. With the arrival of Belt and Road, however, new questions have emerged over
whether China is perpetrating a policy of economic statecraft that undermines Western,
neoliberal development models, namely the Washington Consensus. Though there has been
ample study of the effect of China’s economic policies on its own domestic politics and
economic success, there has been limited opportunity to understand how these policies would
work—and whether China intends to promote them—on an international scale, until now.
The Belt and Road Initiative has a foothold on most continents, and promises to change
the way goods are distributed to and from the world’s largest and most prolific manufacturer.
The BRI is relevant to any person invested in the economic futures of many countries in Asia,
Europe, and Africa. Those who are concerned with questions of international security should
also take heed of the Belt and Road. As this paper will demonstrate, the Belt and Road Initiative
has already exacerbated existing tensions between the United States and China. The United
States and other nations are accusing China of using the Belt and Road Initiative as a cover to
increase its political influence around the world. From a geopolitical analyst’s perspective, it is
crucial to understand whether China is laying the foundation for sustainable alliances which
China can leverage should questions surrounding, say, islands in the South China Sea or
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Taiwan’s independence come up in the future. At the highest level, Belt and Road should interest
anyone who wants a glimpse into the future of international development and cooperation. Since
the end of the Cold War the international community has been dominated by the United States.
Belt and Road presents the most concerted effort on the part of another state to challenge that
hegemony. Anyone who is interested in international politics should pay rapt attention.

Structure, Methodology and Sources

The paper begins with an overview of the key elements of the Belt and Road Initiative, as
well as a brief literature review. This section will highlight how the Belt and Road Initiative is
being financed and implemented as well as the response to Belt and Road from within China, the
countries where it is already ongoing, and from the international community at large (particularly
the United States). For all of these actors, it is crucial to distinguish between the stated views of
political leaders and their citizens. This distinction is important because it will help lend nuance
to the global response to the Initiative. As is laid out in the literature review below, media
reports, especially American ones, tend to characterize the Initiative as dangerous. The Chinese,
they argue, are pulling the wool over everyone’s eyes in a transparent plot to eclipse the United
States. For this reason, the introduction and first chapter will strive to be evenhanded in
explaining the terms of Belt and Road.
The bulk of the paper will focus on the chosen case studies: Pakistan and Kenya. A full
discussion of how these cases were picked is included in the following section. Each case will
include analysis of how and why Belt and Road came to that country, the progress of the
projects, the responses in the country from both its leaders and the citizens to Belt and Road, and
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discussion of who have been the winners and losers. Finally, the cases will highlight the greatest
challenges to BRI’s success in the recipient countries. As previously stated, most of the projects
are still under construction, which makes much of the discussion over future impact speculative.
However, there are some projects that have been completed, and it will be interesting to analyze
what their effect thus far has been on local communities. A large portion of the case studies will
be devoted to understanding any geopolitical implications. The geopolitical impact is easier to
investigate given that states have swiftly responded to the BRI. For both Pakistan and Kenya, it
is possible to have a meaningful discussion of the geopolitical ramifications of Belt and Road.
Finding reliable, thorough sources is a challenge for any research on Belt and Road. The
project is ongoing, which means much of the reporting is made up of snapshots of projects or
temporarily valid observations. Moreover, China’s government has a well-deserved reputation
for reticence when it comes to its internal affairs. Because of this, as of yet, there is no
authoritative source on Belt and Road projects. One sees instead, many conflicting accounts.
Luckily, however, the salience of the project has led to a wealth of reporting from media outlets.
This includes general news outlets like The New York Times and BBC, as well as more
specialized publications such as Foreign Policy, The Diplomat, and The Financial Times. The
BRI is of keen interest to policymakers around the globe, making it a popular topic for many
journalists. While these articles are helpful for establishing a foundation of knowledge on the
Initiative, they are usually not particularly profound. Additionally, they tend to pick a side in the
“debt-trap diplomacy” argument (explained below). In the past two years, there has been an
increase in academic research on the subject, both from international institutions and academic
journals. For example, The World Bank has published several articles on the potential economic
impact of Belt and Road. The International Monetary Fund has conducted less research
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specifically on Belt and Road, but its quarterly reporting on regional economic outlooks is a
helpful—though often tangential—source.
In terms of primary sources, the United States has a number of Pentagon and State
Department reports speaking directly to its view on the Belt and Road Initiative. Unfortunately,
the actual contracts for the projects are not publicly available. Yet reliable research has been
conducted to determine, for example, whether the contracts favor Chinese firms.2 Beyond
finding sources, a substantial challenge in researching the Initiative is staying up-to-date on
developments. News breaks frequently on the Initiative, which can cast doubt on previous
findings. However, the fact that this is a nascent and dynamic area of research is what makes a
senior thesis on the topic exciting and important.

The Case Studies

After giving an overview of the Belt and Road Initiative globally, the paper will focus on
the case studies of Kenya and Pakistan. These countries were primarily chosen according to the
following criteria: the significance and progress of Belt and Road projects within them, quantity
and quality of existing literature, and their ability to complement each other as cases. Though
China boasts of the long list of countries who have signed on as participants, in many of them,
work has barely begun to ramp up. Pakistan, however, is one of the largest recipients of BRI
investment. China has already invested over $62 billion in one of the crown jewels of Belt and

2

Ghossein, Tania, Hoekman, et al. “Public Procurement in the Belt and Road Initiative (English).” MTI Discussion
Paper; no. 10. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2018.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/143241544213097139/Public-Procurement-in-the-Belt-and-RoadInitiative. Accessed December 14, 2018.
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Road: the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).3 Kenya is by no means as integral to the
Belt and Road as Pakistan. Yet in Kenya, a $3.2 billion portion of railroad from Mombasa on the
coast to the capital of Nairobi is already open for business.4 Additionally, their significance
means that even though there is little research entirely devoted to Kenya and Pakistan, they are
more likely to appear in general studies of the Initiative. Thus Pakistan and Kenya serve as
illustrative examples that have potential to yield conclusions generally applicable to other
recipient countries.
The BRI’s heavy emphasis on Pakistan is not surprising given the historically congenial
relationship between Pakistan and China. China and Pakistan have cultivated a strong working
relationship in the past half-century. A Brookings report called China’s ties to Pakistan “the
closest thing that Beijing has had to an alliance.” But there is another dimension to the SinoPakistan quasi-alliance, it serves as a counterweight to the US/India strategic cooperation, a
thorn in the side of both China and Pakistan. The Belt and Road Initiative’s has also unfolded
during a time when the United States has cut off much of its foreign aid to Pakistan. This may be
why Pakistan is pursuing closer economic and military ties with China. Thus the Belt and Road
Initiative’s presence in Pakistan provides an opportunity to determine any geopolitical or military
motivations to the project, especially with regards to countering the United States.
Kenya, on the other hand, demonstrates China’s desire to use Belt and Road to break into
a region where it has had far less historical influence, especially as compared to the United
States. But in 2000 China established the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Co-

3

Zumbrun, Josh and Saumya Vaishampayan. “For IMF Help, Pakistan Might Have to Disclose Its China Debts.”
The Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-imf-help-pakistan-might-have-todisclose-its-china-debts-1539234162. Accessed October 26, 2018.
4
Aglionby, John. “Kenyan Railway Highlights Sharper Focus on Affordability.” Financial Times, September 25,
2018. https://www.ft.com/content/4bd994d8-9c9b-11e8-88de-49c908b1f264. Accessed December 14, 2018.
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operation marking its desire to expand its footprint in Africa in the the 21st Century. Building a
relationship with Kenya has been key to that endeavor. For many African nations, China
represents a financial partner of a very different type than the United States and Western
European nations. Unlike Western countries, China is promising “no-strings attached” lending,
which will not be contingent on adhering to any human rights or governance standards.5
Consequently, China’s investment activities in Africa are already causing tension with other
nations who worry that decades of work to improve political conditions in Africa is in jeopardy.6
As a case, Kenya is an opportunity to analyze how China maneuvers in a new area of influence
where it has far fewer reliable friends. China is moving into a region where the United States has
historically been the largest contributor of FDI.7 Recently, on December 13, U.S. National
Security Advisor John Bolton gave a speech to the Heritage Foundation in which he laid out a
plan to counter rising Chinese influence and investment in Africa. He called China a direct
“threat” to the continent’s wellbeing and warned that China’s “predatory” lending would have
“disturbing effects.”8 In response, Bolton said that the United States would roll out a $60 billion
program called “Prosper Africa” to direct greater American investment into the continent.
Evidently, the Belt and Road’s investment in Africa is already prompting a change in policy
from the United States.

5

Li, Xiaojun. “China is offering ‘no strings attached aid’ to Africa. Here’s what that means.” The Washington Post,
September 27, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/27/china-is-offering-nostrings-attached-aid-to-africa-heres-what-that-means/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.668c6d981e6c. Accessed
December 15, 2018.
6
Lynch, Collum. “China Enlists U.N. to Promote Its Belt and Road Project.” Foreign Policy, May 10, 2018.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/10/china-enlists-u-n-to-promote-its-belt-and-road-project/. Accessed December
16, 2018.
7
Adegoke Yinka and Farai Shawn Matiashe. “US corporates made more investments in Africa in 2017 than
businesses from any other country.” Quartz, November 6, 2018. https://qz.com/africa/1451768/us-still-leads-chinain-fdi-investments-in-africa/. Accessed December 16, 2018.
8
Calamur, Krishnadev. “Africa Is the New Front in the U.S.-China Influence War.” The Atlantic, December 14,
2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/12/trump-national-security-adviser-unveils-newafrica-strategy/578140/. Accessed December 15, 2018.
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Taken together, Pakistan and Kenya can provide distinctive as well as predictive insights
into Belt and Road. Both countries represent the bread and butter of the Initiative, while also
demonstrating some key challenges to the project’s implementation which are certain to repeat
themselves in other areas. But unlike countries like Malaysia who have pared down their Belt
and Road projects, Pakistan and Kenya are pushing forward. Even so, both Pakistan and Kenya
have expressed worry over their ability to pay back their debts. In Pakistan’s case, their debt may
affect their ability to receive financing from the International Monetary Fund. In October 2018,
the IMF demanded that Pakistan be more forthcoming with the nature of its debts to China,
before receiving a bailout from the institution. The request from Pakistan to the IMF has
exacerbated tensions with United States officials, who reportedly “have said they don’t want
taxpayer money, funneled through the IMF, to end up funding a bailout of China.”9 In Kenya,
there are similar concerns and Kenyan officials have signaled that they will be more selective in
taking on additional debts from the Chinese.10 Furthermore, a recent New York Times article
reported that some Kenyans believe that the influx of Chinese immigrants has led to racism and
discrimination against the native population.11 Not only do Pakistan and Kenya represent the
enormous economic and geopolitical opportunity of Belt and Road, they also display some of the
most significant barriers to success.

9

Zumbrun and Vaishampayan.
Aglionby.
11
Goldstein, Joseph. “Kenyans Say Chinese Investment Brings Racism and Discrimination.” The New York Times,
October 15, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/world/africa/kenya-china-racism.html. Accessed October
26, 2018.
10
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Literature Review

Broadly speaking, the Belt and Road Initiative is a trillion dollar, multi-faceted
investment and development project spanning over 60 countries all over the world. The wide
array of projects is divided geographically into two categories: the land-based Silk Road
Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Infrastructure plans include railroads,
airports, pipelines, and sea ports, among others. Participating countries make up over 30% of the
world’s GDP and over 60% of the world’s population.12 Other than these basic facts, there is
little consensus among academics, journalists, politicians, and development organizations on
what exactly the Belt and Road Initiative entails or what its impact will be. Yet there is a
prevailing conflict in the literature between viewing the BRI as a “neocolonial white elephant
project” or as a genuine opportunity to change the development landscape.
Scholarly debate over whether China is attempting to undermine Western international
development standards predates the Belt and Road Initiative. The idea of a Beijing Consensus
that would challenge the Washington Consensus was introduced by an American scholar in 2004
who wrote that it “replaces the widely-discredited Washington Consensus, an economic theory
made famous in the 1990s for its prescriptive, Washington-knows-best approach to telling other
nations how to run themselves.”13 In the 15 years since the term was coined, many Western
academics have used “Beijing Consensus” to describe China’s domestic economic policies even
though no official “Beijing Consensus” was ever authored by the CCP. Now, some are pointing
to the BRI as an example of how China plans to pursue an economic statecraft policy which

12

Freund, Caroline and Michael Ruta. “Brief: Belt and Road Initiative.” The World Bank, March 29, 2018.
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative.print. Accessed December 11,
2018.
13
Ramo, Joshua Cooper. “The Beijing Consensus.” London: The Foreign Policy Centre. 2004.
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would challenge Western development norms and provide a way for developing countries to
implement a Chinese model for development. For example, some see the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank as an organization that is a direct alternative to Bretton Woods institutions that
promote free-market economics. Yet other scholars view the AIIB as a good-natured attempt by
the Chinese to make its economic development projects multilateral and thus more palatable to
its skeptics.14 Overall, however, there is a scarcity of literature connecting BRI to theoretical
questions concerning international development. Up to now, the focus in academic circles when
writing on BRI has been on taking stock of the tangible impacts of the projects.
Debate over economic statecraft is also not new. Political thinkers have written about its
value for centuries though the term was given new importance following the seminal 1985
publication of David Allen Baldwin’s book, Economic Statecraft. The concept is simple to
understand. As opposed to, say, military statecraft, states can use economic policies to achieve
foreign policy goals. In Baldwin’s book, he focuses on economic sanctions as an example of an
effective economic statecraft strategy. At a high level, debates over the intentions of Belt and
Road are really a question of whether it is economic statecraft. As the rest of this literature
review will demonstrate, many analysts, particularly in the United States, do view Belt and Road
as economic statecraft. Some argue that this is particularly concerning because China’s use of
Belt and Road as economic statecraft is happening as the United States winds down this foreign
policy tool.15 A Brookings report states that President Xi Jinping’s foreign policy “suggests a
greater emphasis on using economic means for the pursuit of security goals. […] Under
President Xi Jinping, these trends have accelerated in the form of more concrete initiatives and

14

Wong, Audrye. “China’s Economic Statecraft under Xi Jinping.” Brookings, January 22, 2019.
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-economic-statecraft-under-xi-jinping/. Accessed February 25, 2019.
15
Blackwill, Robert D. and Jennifer M. Harris. “The Lost Art of Economic Statecraft.” Foreign Affairs, March
2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-02-16/lost-art-economic-statecraft. Accessed March 25, 2019.
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the development of a more aggressive form of economic statecraft.”16 Thus Belt and Road has
given new life to debates over the role of economic statecraft in contemporary international
relations.
In the United States, news articles on Belt and Road tend to include ominous predictions
about China’s seemingly nefarious intentions and strategies. For example, there has been heavy
news coverage in the United States on a Belt and Road project in Sri Lanka. The New York Times
did an in-depth report on the Hambantota Port titled, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a
Port.”17 The Hambantota Port is cited as an example of how China plans to use the Belt and
Road Initiative to suck countries into a “debt-trap.” After Sri Lanka was unable to pay off its
debt, China accepted the port on a 99-year lease as restitution. The New York Times called it:
“one of the most vivid examples of China’s ambitious use of loans and aid to gain influence
around the world — and of its willingness to play hardball to collect.”18 The article further
warns: “The debt deal also intensified some of the harshest accusations about President Xi
Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative; that the global investment and lending program
amounts to a debt trap for vulnerable countries around the world, fueling corruption and
autocratic behavior in struggling democracies.”19 Other American publications have written
similarly dark predictions about Belt and Road. In The Washington Post, one journalist wrote
that “China has never spared any effort to portray its Belt and Road Initiative, a grand, trilliondollar-plus global investment plan, as a positive vision for the world.”20 While the Editorial

16

Wong.
Abi-Habib, Maria. “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port.” The New York Times, June 25, 2018.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html. Accessed October 20, 2018.
18
Abi-Habib.
19
Abi-Habib.
20
Taylor, Adam. “Why countries might want out of China’s Belt and Road.” The Washington Post, August 22,
2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/08/22/why-countries-might-want-out-chinas-beltroad/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.fde02ef7a4f9. Accessed October 25, 2018.
17
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Board of The National Review wrote that “sold as a magnanimous undertaking to bestow
infrastructure on impoverished countries in Central, South, and Southeast Asia, the BRI in
reality is a signifier of China’s ongoing strategy to consolidate its power in the region and
strengthen its geopolitical hand.”21 This framing of BRI as a “debt-trap” is starting to receive
pushback in the United States, however. One recent article published in Quartz, an online news
source, stated that “The language of “debt-trap diplomacy” reflects Western anxieties, not
African realities.”22 As the actual effects of BRI unfold, this position may continue to change.
Unsurprisingly given the Communist Party’s influence over journalism in China,
reporting in Chinese newspapers has been overwhelmingly positive. Even so, dissenting opinions
have recently emerged.23 In China as in Western countries there is growing skepticism over
funneling money into communities that are far from home.
There is even less consensus among academic scholars on whether the Belt and Road
Initiative is a debt-trap diplomacy or neocolonial scheme. Even so, recent literature agrees that
there are economic as well as geopolitical motivations driving BRI. In terms of financial
motivating factors, many scholars point to China’s extra industrial and labor capacities. As
domestic infrastructure projects slow down, utilizing its surplus overseas is a convenient
option.24 The official stated goal of the BRI also bears weight: that China launched the BRI to

21

Editorial Board, “China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy.” National Review, July 3, 2018.
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/07/china-belt-and-road-initiative-debt-trap-diplomacy/. Accessed October 20,
2018.
22
Moore, W. Gyude. “The Language of ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’ Reflects Western Anxieties, Not African Realities.”
Quartz, September 17, 2018. https://qz.com/1391770/the-anxious-chorus-around-chinese-debt-trap-diplomacydoesnt-reflect-african-realities/. Accessed October 24, 2018.
23
Bulloch, Douglas. “After a Brief Silence, Skeptics of China’s Belt and Road Initiative Are Speaking Up Again.”
Forbes, April 18, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/douglasbulloch/2018/04/18/china-belt-road-initiative-oborsilk-road/#192d5cc854da. Accessed October 24, 2018.
24
Djankov, Simeon. “The Rationale behind China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” China's Belt and Road Initiative:
Motives, Scope, and Challenges, edited by Simeon Djankov and Sean Miner. Peterson Institute for International
Economics, 2016, pp. 6-13; Fickling, David. “Soviet Collapse Echoes in China’s Belt and Road.” Bloomberg,
August 12, 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-12/soviet-collapse-echoes-in-china-s-beltand-road-investment. Accessed October 25, 2018.
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facilitate the flow of its goods throughout Asia and Europe. Scholars agrees that this is an
important economic objective for a country relying so heavily on exporting manufactured
goods.25 Moreover, the highways, railways, and pipelines will run two ways. Not only will it be
easier for China to get things out, it will also be much easier to get crucial raw materials in.26
While the economic motivations for BRI are clear, the full effects remain to be seen.
Scholarship is more divided on geopolitical aims of BRI. The official party line is that the
BRI is providing investment in areas long ignored by Western lending institutions.27 But while
one journalist writes that “African states will continue to look toward Chinese lending as a
significant component of the suite of tools available to deal with poverty and the gap in
infrastructure financing,”28 another calls the BRI “Sino-centric,” highlighting that “all [BRI land
and sea] connections lead back to China.”29
The debate surrounding a “debt-trap diplomacy” strategy is ongoing among academics.
Many point to the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka as an example of this geopolitical tactic in
action while others say the BRI has the potential to reduce economic inequality, which will foster
good will towards China.30 If there is any consensus regarding China’s geopolitical motives with
the BRI it is that China wants to become a major player in international development, but it will
face strong headwinds both from home and abroad.
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Miner, Sean. “The Rationale behind China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” China's Belt and Road Initiative: Motives,
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There is widely held agreement on the biggest challenges to the Belt and Road Initiative’s
implementation and long-term success. One challenge is in direct response to the “debt-trap”
theory. As one article put it: “defaults on investments cause problems for creditors as well as
debtors.”31 The economics of the project remain vague, causing some analysts to question
China’s math.32 China’s own citizens have noticed that the numbers may not add up. There is a
growing body of literature on domestic backlash to the BRI. One report claims that this backlash
has already led to a pulling back of BRI investment: “A sustained downturn in BRI lending at the
same time that domestic criticism of the initiative emerges into China’s tightly controlled public
discourse may indicate the existence of a emerging—and potentially enduring—consensus that
Beijing should keep its overseas lending ambitions modest.”33
International pressures may also pose a roadblock to China accomplishing its goals. The
United States, India, and Europe have been vocal about their distaste for the project, which may
force China to scale back the program.34 In the immediate, future, however, scholarship predicts
that local backlash to the Belt and Road Initiative in countries receiving aid is the greatest
threat.35 There has been notable backlash in Malaysia and Pakistan, two key BRI countries, and
leaders in both countries have promised to investigate the terms of Chinese lending. Not only has
the “debt-trap” argument gained traction in these countries, but locals have begun to question
whether BRI’s benefits will trickle down to them. Literature on Belt and Road agrees that
China’s stipulations that infrastructure projects exclusively contract Chinese companies will
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perpetuate local and international backlash. However, research into the actual economic
implications of BRI is ongoing. Some preliminary research concludes that Chinese foreign
investment reduces economic inequality in the receiving region.36 But these papers are not
exclusively focused on BRI projects. Since most BRI projects have not been completed it is
impossible to draw any definitive conclusions about the relative economic gains or losses just
yet. But the fact that local communities are protesting BRI is indicative of future challenges
Literature on Kenya and Pakistan is similarly focused on the questions surrounding debt
levels and tangible benefit to local populations. A lot of recent media reports have focused on the
IMF’s pressure on Pakistan to the terms of their debts to the Chinese public. The recent events
concerning Pakistan have led many Western reporters to conclude that BRI is losing ground in
the country. An article in Bloomberg wrote that Pakistan’s request for an IMF bailout
represented how “a program meant to draw countries into China’s orbit may just end up pushing
them back into Western arms.”37 Scholars agree that Pakistan’s plea to the IMF spells trouble for
both itself and the BRI. Though the exact sum of Pakistan’s debts to China remain secret,
estimates for the CPEC go up to $62 billion and the World Bank estimates that Pakistan’s total
external debts are around $72 billion.38 Further research on Pakistan must be done to get past the
discussion on debt to uncover other impacts of BRI.
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Though media reports on BRI investment in Kenya are also mostly concerned with debt
burden, there is an added dimension of interest to many scholars. As previously noted, China is
not a long-time player in African development or politics. Thus many writers are more
preoccupied with the possibility of tension arising between China and the United States as a
direct consequence of BRI activities.39 However, there is also a larger academic debate
concerning whether or not the BRI is a net positive opportunity for Kenya, and Africa at large.
One writer notes that the railroad China funded in Kenya is the largest infrastructure investment
in the country since declaring independence in 1963.40 While another warns that China is
encouraging autocracy and corruption by ignoring governance standards in recipient countries
and promoting its own “illiberal [and] repressive” agenda.41 This debate challenges the east vs.
west paradigm that is so prevalent in the broader literature on BRI. There is some evidence that
Western institutions are even embracing the BRI as a much-needed source of capital in
underdeveloped African nations, like Kenya.42 Like Pakistan, there is a deficit in facts and
figures as it pertains to the terms and conditions of BRI projects.
The Belt and Road Initiative has already greatly impacted international development and
security. It represents China’s potential as a major player in the field of international
development, the first legitimate challenge to the United States worldwide in decades. For the
receiving countries, BRI is an opportunity to finally meet the developed world in the 21st
century. Though the BRI has captured the world’s attention, there is a lack of balanced academic
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literature. This thesis on the BRI is undertaken to seize an exciting opportunity to contribute a
new voice to a quickly growing area of research.
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Chapter I:
Overview of the Belt and Road Initiative

China is not an amateur lender. It has been the United States’ largest creditor for several
years and currently holds over $1 TN in U.S. treasury bonds.43 The Belt and Road Initiative,
however, is a coordinated development project more akin to the post-World War II Marshall
Plan than engaging in ad-hoc investments—though China rejects this comparison. There is no
definitive list of how many countries are officially a part of the BRI. This paper will use the
World Bank’s 2018 estimates, which puts the number at 66 countries (including China).44 It
should be noted that this number fluctuates in academic and journalistic scholarship, though it
generally falls between 60 and 70, depending on the time of writing.

Launch and Implementation

In the initial rollout, The Belt and Road Initiative was called “One Belt One Road,”
referencing the fact that it was composed of two, geographically defined components: the landbased Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The former was
announced in the previously mentioned speech in Kazakhstan, and the latter was announced
shortly after at a speech in Indonesia. Under a framework established in an official report
released by the PRC in March 2015, the Belt portion focused on three broad strategic priorities
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which would link China to the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Persian Gulf.45 The
Road portion includes two routes intended to connect the East China Sea to the Mediterranean
Sea and to the South Pacific Ocean.46
Figure 1: Land and sea-based routes of BRI

Source: Financial Times47

Many countries, particularly in South Asia, have projects that fall under both the landbased and sea-based initiatives. The project has evolved, however, into a much broader, and
more global, investment program. BRI was always an “open project,” and President Xi invited
countries to express interest in joining.48 Now, the PRC leadership includes several Latin
American countries as BRI participants, despite the fact that many infrastructure projects in these
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places, such as a railroad in Argentina, do not logically fit into either the Silk Road or Maritime
Belt networks.49
The PRC’s key word with regards to the BRI is “connectivity.” The primary stated
purpose of the SREB and MSR is to physically improve connections between China and the rest
of Asia and Europe. These infrastructure connections will principally impact trade flowing in and
out of China. After all, the inspiration for the BRI is the ancient silk road, the longest trade route
of the ancient world. In a 2017 speech to the Belt and Road Forum, President Xi emphasized that
his priority was to revive the glory of the ancient silk road: “History is our best teacher. The
glory of the ancient silk routes shows that geographical distance is not insurmountable. If we
take the first courageous step towards each other, we can embark on a path leading to friendship,
shared development, peace, harmony and a better future.”50 Evidently, the BRI has expanded to
more than railroads and oil pipelines. In the same speech, President Xi outlined the “soft”
connectivity goals for the Initiative. In addition to facilitating trade, the BRI now seeks to
improve policy, people-to-people and financial connectivity. In addition to building physical
infrastructure, President Xi wants the BRI to be an “open platform of cooperation and uphold
and grow an open world economy.”51 Thus the BRI represents a dramatic step forward for China
into the realm of international development and economic cooperation.
Financing for the Initiative is to be accomplished through a web of funds, state-backed
banks, and other financial institutions. The financial scale of BRI is massive and growing. There
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have been up to $8 TN in announced BRI investments.52 These deals do not equate to foreign
aid, however. Though many of the loans are issued with generous terms, China expects to get a
return on investment, which is where many of the concerns over insurmountable debts arise.
Currently, the Hambantota Port is the only example of a deal the Chinese would be willing to
strike should a BRI country fail to repay their debts.53 In December 2014, China established the
Silk Road Fund, which, according to its mission statement “is dedicated to supporting
infrastructure, resources and energy development, industrial capacity cooperation and financial
cooperation in countries and regions involved in the Belt and Road Initiative to ensure medium
and long-term financial sustainability and reasonable returns on investment.”54 The Fund
receives capital contributions from China’s other state-backed banks and investment funds.
Confusingly, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was also established in 2014 with
the stated purpose to “improve social and economic outcomes in Asia.” Yet the BRI (and its Silk
Road Fund) and the AIIB are separate entities. The AIIB functions as a multilateral development
bank, more similar to a regional World Bank. Though the AIIB has invested in BRI projects, its
mandate includes a much broader array of investment opportunities.
So far, the most progress has been made in BRI projects in Central and South Asia. The
New Eurasian Land Bridge now includes a freight rail line that allows goods to get from Yiwu,
on the eastern coast of China to Madrid in just 18 days.55 According to Chinese state-backed
media, the Yiwu-Xinjiang-Europe railway had completed 460 trans-Eurasia trips by July of
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2018. A new gas pipeline now extends from Kunming to Myanmar and new ports are dotted
throughout coasts of Southeast Asia, Europe, Australia, and Africa.56 Construction has not been
all smooth-sailing, however. China has run into roadblocks which has forced it to halt or delay
projects in several locations. This point is discussed further in the following section.

International response to BRI

Overall, the reaction to BRI from underdeveloped countries has been overwhelmingly
positive. In an age when the United States and many other Western developed economies had
turned down the tap on development aid, China is committing to injecting countries with billions
of dollars to build critical infrastructure. In a 2017 report, the Asian Development Bank
estimated that it would take $26 TN in spending between 2016 and 2030 to “maintain its growth
momentum, eradicate poverty, and respond to climate change” in Asia.57 This comes out to a
required $1.7 TN annually, while the region only currently invests $881 BN annually. The ADB
calculated that without the PRC, the gap between infrastructure needs and investments in Asia
would double, reaching 5% of GDP between 2016 and 2020. Additionally, China is focusing its
investments in countries that have never been priorities for the United States. Take Kyrgyzstan
as an example. China provided over $300 MN of FDI into Kyrgyzstan in 2016 compared to $25
MN from the United States.58 And this $25 MN is over 100% more in FDI from the U.S. since
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2013 (when the BRI was launched), suggesting that the U.S. wants to compete with China for
regional economic power. To underdeveloped countries China is an obviously desirable
economic partner merely because they are willing to provide the cash. The United States’
argument that China has insidious plans is not very compelling when it simultaneously refuses to
close the investment gap.
The sheer quantity of funding via loans is not the only thing which makes BRI an
attractive opportunity. Researchers have found that the project’s emphasis on connective
infrastructure can help diffuse wealth and development throughout a country, rather than
concentrating it in urban centers.59 Unlike colonial investments which were localized and in
some cases exacerbated economic inequalities in developing countries, China is more willing to
fund transportation projects which are by nature are more diffuse in terms of their economic
impact.60 Moreover, the BRI intends to deliver finished infrastructure projects on a short timeline
whereas Western development organizations have focused aid efforts on improving social
programs like education and healthcare. While important, this type of development takes much
longer to deliver results which are harder to quantify, and do not include flashy ribbon-cutting
ceremonies.
From a geopolitical standpoint, it is less obvious what countries stand to gain by
partnering with China. One potential advantage, primarily in Central Asian countries, would be
combating the rise of extremism, a byproduct that China also hopes to accomplish through BRI.
But as of now China has not committed any funds to specifically improving national security in
the countries where it is financing projects, so any change would be derivative of the BRI rather
than intentional. The Belt and Road Initiative may also allow Central Asian countries to wean
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themselves off of their dependence on Russia. These countries have struggled to achieve
economic success since the fall of the Soviet Union. They have relied on Russia economically to
little avail and a recent downturn in the health of the Russian economy has only aggravated
financial difficulties in the region.61 Joining BRI not only provides massive quantities of FDI, but
also an additional, wealthy economic partner.
To this date, the most intense rebukes of Belt and Road from countries that previously
welcomed the investment have come from Malaysia and the Maldives. In the Maldives, a newlyelected Prime Minister criticized China for overinflating the cost of BRI projects and stated that
he was pursuing closer ties with one of China’s largest competitors, India, in response.62 A new
Maldivian Finance Minister has stated that China should reduce the amount owed by the
Maldives in the wake of revelations that Maldivian government officials were getting kickbacks
from Chinese contractors, driving up the prices of BRI projects.63 Yet even though Maldivian
government has requested renegotiating the terms of the loans, it has not officially backed out of
any projects, to this point.
In Malaysia, newly-elected Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed ran on a campaign that
sharply criticized his predecessor for driving the country into dangerous levels of debt for BRI
projects. Following his election, Mohamed cancelled over $20 BN of BRI projects including
several gas pipelines and a railway.64 Not only was debt in Malaysia becoming unsustainable—it
61
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grew to 65% of GDP in 2018—but evidence emerged that Belt and Road projects were entangled
in the larger 1MDB corruption scandal. The Wall Street Journal reported that Chinese officials
offered help to Malaysian officials to cover up evidence of wrongdoing in exchange for Belt and
Road deals.65 The article claims that minutes from meetings between Chinese and Malaysians
reveal that “although the projects’ purposes were “political in nature”—to shore up Mr. Najib’s
government, settle the 1MDB debts and deepen Chinese influence in Malaysia—it was
imperative the public see them as market-driven.”66 Yet Prime Minister Mohamed still has not
pulled Malaysia out of all its contracts with China. In August he had firmly placed the blame on
his predecessor: “It is not about the Chinese, it is about the Malaysian government. They
borrowed huge sums of money and now we have problems trying to repay the money that they
have owed…That is Malaysians playing around with money, not even doing proper feasibility
studies and due diligence before going into business.”67 Mohamed has not publicly reneged on
this statement even since The Wall Street Journal reported its findings. There is no evidence that
BRI was involved in sovereign wealth corruption scandals in other countries. Though analysts
are pointing to Malaysia as an example of “the dark side of China’s Belt and Road Initiative,”
there is no reason to believe this activity extends beyond Malaysia. The fact that the new
Malaysian Prime Minister is still moving forward with a number of BRI projects is also a sign
that this scandal has not dealt a fatal blow to the Initiative, in Malaysia or elsewhere.
It is important to note that the Maldives and Malaysia are outliers. Most BRI countries
are eager to continue working with the Chinese. A 2016 survey of 36 Africa countries found that
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63% of respondents thought China was a “somewhat or very positive” influence in their
country.68 Later chapters will highlight systemic challenges to the success of BRI. Yet there is no
reason to believe that there is an impending defection from the project by host countries. For the
time being, the vast majority are eager to forge ahead with Belt and Road.
The Belt and Road Initiative prompted negative responses from primarily the United
States, Japan, India, and some Western European countries. The skeptical response from these
countries is not surprising given their historic tensions with China. All of these countries have
reason to be concerned about rising Chinese influence. While recent news cycles have focused
on the growing trade war between the United States and China, the Belt and Road Initiative has
also exacerbated tensions between the countries. But even this side-effect of the Initiative has so
far served the interests of BRI participant countries. As of now, the response from China’s rivals
has tended to be a planned increase in FDI to BRI participants from Western nations seeking to
counter the BRI rather than any punitive measures. This has resulted in the beginnings of an
intensifying competition to offer development aid in Africa and Asia. For example, in addition to
the Prosper Africa initiative the United States has rolled out a similar program in the AsiaPacific. In a November 2018 Asia Pacific Economic Council meeting, the United States, Japan,
and Australia announced their trilateral partnership to increase development aid to the AsiaPacific.69 So far, there have been no official reports on the size of the program. Shortly after the
BRI was launched Japan announced its own infrastructure investment initiative in Asia called the
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Partnership for Quality Infrastructure. It also has partnered with India on a port-building strategy
that would compete directly with the Maritime Silk Road.70
For the most part, however, American officials have focused efforts on warning states not
to engage with China. In the speech in which John Bolton rolled out Prosper Africa he called the
BRI “a plan to develop a series of trade routes leading to and from China with the ultimate goal
of advancing Chinese global dominance.”71 In terms of more local resistance, India is one of the
only countries on the Asian continent to refuse participating in the BRI and officials have issued
similarly strong statements on what it sees as China’s aggressive moves into its own backyard.
Additionally, India has begun to draft an official policy response and boycotted the Belt and
Road Forum in 2017.72 Other countries such as Japan and the European Union are cautiously
signing on to the BRI. While the European Union has partnered with China to build BRI
railroads across the continent, it has also issued statements on the BRI declaring that it “runs
counter to the EU agenda for liberalizing trade and pushes the balance of power in favor of
subsidized Chinese companies.”73 Japan also has denounced China’s actions while
simultaneously exploring opportunities for collaboration. While partnering with the U.S. and
India on rival infrastructure initiatives, Japan has warmed its diplomatic relations with China and
expressed interest in partnering on projects, particularly in Southeast Asia.74 Japan’s pivot to
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supporting the BRI comes amid a broader push to improve relations with China. Some
hypothesize that with its lagging economy Japan could not pass up the opportunity to create
business for its firms.75 There is also speculation that the ongoing trade war between China and
the United States has pushed China to foster closer economic ties with Japan.76 For now, Japan is
able to play both sides of the field. It is unclear how long that will be the case.
Though China is known for its censorship of domestic criticism, the PRC has repeatedly
attempted to ease international concerns that the BRI is a geopolitical scheme. By inviting
countries to join the BRI, China has sought to make its investing decisions more transparent and
portray Belt and Road as a multilateral, rather than unilateral, effort. Furthermore, China has
curried favor with United Nations officials, signing economic and policy partnerships with the
institution. The United Nations has gone so far as to help promote the Belt and Road Initiative
with officials going on the record saying that “the Belt and Road Initiative represents a powerful
platform for economic growth and regional cooperation.”77
Currently, it seems unlikely that the Belt and Road Initiative alone can change China’s
reputation on the world stage. In the past year increased attention has been paid to China’s
mistreatment of its Muslim minority population, and western nations have stepped up
accusations of cyber espionage, particularly towards Chinese telecommunications company
Huawei. Even so, most BRI participant countries are moving forward with contracts, apparently
unperturbed by American warnings. Yet the future of the BRI is now dependent on whether
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China can deliver on its immense promises. The following section examines whether the BRI is
living up to its reputation in its flagship country: Pakistan.
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Chapter II
Pakistan Case Study

The centerpiece to the Belt and Road Initiative is Pakistan. The China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) promises $62 BN in Chinese investments into a complex web of highways,
railways, pipelines, and sea ports ultimately connecting Xinjiang, in northwest China, to
Pakistan’s southern tip of Gwadar. CPEC is the bread and butter of Belt and Road. It represents
all of the BRI’s original economic intentions: to improve connectivity with a key, but
underdeveloped, regional player, create opportunities for China’s underutilized construction and
manufacturing industries, and reduce transportation times between China and countries to its far
west. Not only does CPEC seek to improve infrastructure within Pakistan and between the two
countries, it is laying the foundation to eventually provide a direct pathway from China to its oil
suppliers in the Middle East. Additionally, CPEC also demonstrates the potential geopolitical
impacts of BRI: China is strengthening its alliance with a long-time, crucial partner, building
strategically placed deep sea ports which could eventually serve China’s growing naval power,
and finally, working to contain Muslim extremists who support Uighur separatist movements in
Xinjiang.
Yet while CPEC represents all the shiny promise of BRI, it also has run into the
Initiative’s most formidable roadblocks. Public and political sentiment towards China’s
investment has turned sour, especially as Pakistan was driven to asking the IMF for a bailout due
to rising debts partly incurred because of CPEC. Moreover, the Gwadar port has raised alarms in
the international community and motivated India to build a competing port across the water in
Chabahar. And though CPEC was supposed to help China get a handle on Muslim activists, there
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are signs it is exacerbating tensions in both China and Pakistan. This case study explores all
these elements of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as it is unfolding in real-time. Pakistan
offers the most complete picture of how BRI will impact host countries, both economically and
geopolitically.
President Xi announced the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in 2013 as a multifaceted
development project which would be the crown jewel of Belt and Road. But CPEC did not
inaugurate Chinese investment in Pakistan. Phase 1 construction of the Gwadar Port began in
2002, eleven years before One Belt One Road was born.78 Rather, CPEC is a ramp-up of China’s
infrastructure financing and an intensified effort to cultivate their historically close relationship.
Former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif welcomed China’s extended hand, famously
saying that the Sino-Pakistani friendship was “higher than the Himalayas and deeper than the
deepest sea in the world, and sweeter than honey.”79 This sentiment has been reiterated by
Chinese officials.80 After Sharif was ousted from government due to a corruption scandal, his
successor, Imran Khan came into office less amenable to China’s loans. Even so, most CPEC
projects have continued as planned.
CPEC can be divided into four project types: Road and Rail Infrastructure, Energy,
Gwadar (the Port city is so significant it counts as its own), and Other (includes communications
infrastructure, social programs, and development of special economic zones). The final
completion date for all projects is 2030, though many are slated to open long before then. The
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highways and railways of the CPEC are typical of the Belt and Road Initiative. Two highway
networks are intended to connect Xinjiang to Karachi and Gwadar, providing a direct route
through the center of Pakistan to China.81 Similarly, China is building or refurbishing a series of
railroads throughout Pakistan which will eventually extend up to Kashgar in Xinjiang Province,
the site of a connection hub for BRI railways.82 Reports indicate that new stretches of highway
and railway should begin to open for operation by mid-2019.83
Figure 2: Map of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Source: World Economic Forum84
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Energy Projects of the CPEC

CPEC is particularly focused on energy, more so than BRI projects in other countries.
China has promised over $30 BN for energy projects, meaning that they will make up around
50% of the total invested capital of CPEC. These include wind, coal, and water power plants. At
the time of writing, six plants—two coal and four wind—were listed as officially “operational.”85
These completed plants stretch from Karachi on the southern coast to the northern region of
Punjab. Fifteen additional energy projects are planned throughout the country, promising to
deliver over 17,000 megawatts of power to the national grid.86 The focus on energy serves
multiple goals. While increased energy infrastructure will serve Pakistan’s broader push for
modernization, many of the power plants are being built to serve other CPEC initiatives. To
power the Karachi Port, China built two 660 MW coal-fired power plants, at an estimated cost of
$1.9 BN.87
There are two main geopolitical implications to CPEC’s energy projects. The first is the
effect on regional energy security. CPEC’s focus on domestically sourced wind and coal energy
projects means that Pakistan will eventually become less dependent on the Middle East—
particularly Saudi Arabia—for oil and gas. Currently, Pakistan imports 90% of its oil, which
satisfies over 80% of domestic demand.88 The second implication is that CPEC also has the
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potential to aggravate Sino-Indian and Pakistani-Indian tensions. China’s increased role on the
Indian Ocean may specifically threaten India’s energy supply, since 75% of India’s energy
imports passes through the Indian Ocean.89 India will also lose out on the CPEC pipelines
bringing gas into Pakistan from Central Asia since Pakistan forbids Indian imports and exports
from passing through its borders.90 Circumventing Pakistan to gain access to Central Asia’s gas
reserves is part of the motivation for India’s competing Chabahar Port, which is discussed in
greater detail later in this chapter in relation to the Gwadar Port.91
Pakistan is not the only beneficiary from the CPEC when it comes to energy. China also
stands to gain from the expedited routes to Central Asia and the Middle East. Once the Gwadar
Port is completed, it will provide an alternate and much more direct route for oil from the Persian
Gulf to reach China. A $2 BN plan to build an oil refinery at Gwadar is evidence that China
plans to reroute its oil imports through Pakistan.92 Gwadar not only provides a quicker path for
oil and gas, but also a safer one, since it bypasses the Malacca Strait. Eighty percent of China’s
oil imports pass through the Malacca Strait.93 Yet Chinese officials have long viewed their
reliance on the Malacca Strait as a vulnerability to the country’s energy security.94 Though China
and Pakistan are publicly optimistic about the energy projects of CPEC, doubts are beginning to
emerge as to their viability. The geological realities of the region make constructing tunnels for

89

Mullen, Rani D., and Cody Poplin. “The New Great Game: A Battle for Access and Influence in the IndoPacific.” Foreign Affairs, September 29, 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-09-29/new-greatgame. Accessed February 15, 2019.
90
Kugelman.
91
Mullen and Poplin.
92
Kanwal, Gurneet. “Pakistan’s Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China’s String of Pearl’s in the Indo-Pacific.”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, March, 2018. Pp. 3.
93
Len, Christopher. “China’s Maritime Silk Road and Energy Geopolitics in the Indian Ocean: Motivations and
Implications for the Region.” Washington, D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, vol. 68, November, 2017.
Pp. 44.
94
Len, 44.

38

pipelines exorbitantly difficult and expensive.95 Also, the energy projects are face all the
obstacles highlighted later in this chapter, particularly security from local resistance.

Gwadar Port

The Gwadar Port is such a large component of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
that its associated projects are listed separately from the rest of the CPEC on the Corridor’s
official website. It includes not only the construction of a deep sea port and all the infrastructure
necessary to complete it, but also an oil refinery, an airport, a hospital, and a university. The
Gwadar Port is already operational but the ultimate goal is for Gwadar to be able to handle one
million tons of cargo per year. The Gwadar Port’s critics allege that it is part of what they call
China’s “String of Pearls Strategy” in the Indo-Pacific. There are concerns that China is using
BRI as a cover to line the Indian Ocean with ports that can double as naval bases.96 The
Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and the Kyaukpyu Port in Malaysia are other examples of ports
built under the auspices of BRI that skeptics say are being set up to become naval bases.97
Gwadar’s strategic location on the Indian Ocean is why China is so enthusiastic about the
project, but also why it has drawn international scrutiny as an example of how China is using the
BRI for military and geopolitical aims.
Once completed, the Gwadar Port will be Pakistan’s third commercial port after Karachi
and Qasim. In addition to a serving as a commercial port, China is developing Gwadar as a free
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economic zone modeled after special economic zones like Shenzhen.98 The Gwadar Port was
leased to the state-owned China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC) for 40 years, during
which the firm has complete jurisdiction over development.99 China has already invested over
$1.5 BN for the Port, and the COPHC estimates that the free economic zone will cost around an
additional $5 BN.100 In order to pay off the loans from China, Pakistan agreed to give 91% of the
Gwadar Port’s revenues and 85% of the free economic zone’s revenues back to the COPHC.101
Already, the Gwadar Port Authority has reported that 30 companies have invested approximately
$474 MN in the emerging port city.102 Gwadar is thus expected to easily pay itself off to the
COPHC, which should see enormous profit from the venture.
The imbalance in economic profits being paid out from Gwadar is a source of tension
within Pakistan as well as a signal to BRI’s skeptics that the project is about something other
than infrastructure development. There are other signs that most of the economic advantages will
ultimately go to China. In a press release, the China Pak Investment Corporation announced its
ambitious plans to build an $150 MN modern oasis as part of the Gwadar free economic zone.
The report promised “an open-air shopping boulevard; indoor shopping mall; restaurants and
eateries; an international school & nursery; six community parks; indoor and outdoor sports
facilities including tennis courts and a resident's gymnasium; a water desalination plant and
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recycling centre.”103 If it seems incongruous to build a luxury gated community in one of the
world’s poorest countries, that’s because it is. China does not intend for Pakistanis to live in the
Gwadar International Port City, but rather to relocate Chinese nationals there. In a story reported
by India’s The Economic Times (and repeated in The Diplomat), the China Pak Investment
Corporation is building the gated community for 500,000 Chinese immigrants who are slated to
arrive by 2022.104 These reports have not been confirmed by China, however.
What concerns BRI onlookers, particularly in the United States and India, is that China is
laying the foundation in Gwadar to build its second overseas military base, after Djibouti. So far,
any military designs China may have for Gwadar are pure speculation. News outlets and
government entities in the United States are prone to conflating a growing military relationship
between China and Pakistan with the CPEC. For example, The New York Times warned that the
sale of eight submarines to Pakistan in 2015 meant that one day China “could use the equipment
it sells to the South Asian country to refuel its own submarines, extending its navy’s global
reach.”105 Yet this claim is only backed by circumstantial evidence. Other rumors about China’s
military ambitions in Pakistan have circulated in international media sources without substantial
proof. In early 2018, unconfirmed reports surfaced that China was building a joint air and naval
base in Jiwani, 60km west from Gwadar.106 These reports gained international attention though
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they were never verified. While the South China Morning Post reported an analyst as saying that
China planned to use Jiwani “to dock and maintain naval vessels, as well as provide other
logistical support services” for its military, the PRC has officially denied that it has military
ambitions for Jiwani.107 Either way, Jiwani has no official connection to the CPEC and there is
no evidence that BRI funding is being redirected there.
Recent developments may help alleviate international suspicion of Gwadar. Reports in
January and February of 2019 disclosed that Saudi Arabia plans to become another major
investor in the Gwadar Port. Saudi is reportedly building an oil refinery in Gwadar, and
consequently joining China as a partner in CPEC. Price estimates for the Saudi oil refinery range
from $6 BN to $10 BN, putting the Middle Eastern country on par with China in the emerging
port city.108 And unlike China who is independently, and opaquely, accomplishing CPEC
investment priorities, Saudi Arabia is working with the IMF. In addition to the Gwadar oil
refinery, the Middle Eastern nation is providing $6 BN in aid to help Pakistan restore its foreign
reserves and pay off loans, partly incurred as a result of CPEC.109 The United Arab Emirates is
also in talks to provide loans to Pakistan. So far, the Chinese have not made any move to block
Saudi Arabia’s venture in Gwadar. Though CPEC contracts were bilateral agreements between
Pakistan and China, they allow for other countries to join.110 In fact China has reportedly directly
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invited Russia to join as a CPEC partner, hoping to brand CPEC as a true multinational effort—
and potentially calm anxious onlookers in India.111 Saudi Arabia’s desire to join the CPEC
bandwagon underscores the strategic advantages Gwadar offers, both economically and
geopolitically. Yet it also complicates arguments that China’s grand plan is to make Gwadar a
military base. An article in The Diplomat notes that Saudi’s decision to invest could help garner
a “positive image” for CPEC and help its “credibility […] as a stable opportunity for foreign
investment.”112 However, it is too early to tell how Saudi Arabia’s involvement in CPEC will
impact the success of the BRI.
The Gwadar Port is proving to be one of the most controversial Belt and Road projects.
Unlike BRI’s public roads and railways, it is less clear how the Gwadar Port will serve
Pakistan’s broader economic interests. The Port’s location at a key point along the Indian Ocean
makes it attractive to investors while signaling to skeptics that the Port may be more than a
trading outpost. Additionally, China’s desire to transform Gwadar into a pseudo-Shenzhen is
compounding criticism that it is building a “colony” in Pakistan rather than an inclusive
development program. The following sections expand on the largest threats to Gwadar and other
CPEC projects.

Pakistan’s Debt Crisis

The accusation that the Belt and Road Initiative is “debt-trap diplomacy” was leveled at
the CPEC long before Pakistan publicly admitted it was struggling to repay the Chinese in late
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2018. Onlookers were quick to point out that a $60 BN loan to a country that had asked for 12
IMF bailouts since 1982 was risky and unsustainable. In 2017 the IMF warned that any shortterm gains in FDI from CPEC would be outweighed by the enormous costs of the project.113
Though Chinese officials repeatedly promised that CPEC would eventually pay for itself,
economists in Pakistan calculated that even once fully operational Pakistan would lose almost $4
BN annually.114 At this point, it does seem that Pakistan under Prime Minister Sharif was
overeager to take on debt. From 2013 to 2018 the Pakistan current account deficit rose from $2.5
BN to $18.9 BN.115 So it came as little surprise when the new Prime Minister, Imran Khan,
asked the IMF for a debt relief package in late 2018.
In October, 2018 Pakistan asked for $12 BN from the IMF, its 13th IMF bailout. IMF
Director Christine Lagarde told the country that in order to qualify for the loan, they would need
to fully disclose the size and nature of their debts to other countries. Prime Minister Khan
blamed the financial hardship on the previous administration’s economic decisions, though he
has not explicitly called out the Chinese.116 Though Pakistan’s need for financial assistance
demonstrates the economic burden that BRI can bring to its receiving countries, it does not
wholly prove the “debt-trap diplomacy” argument. Though it is a less than ideal situation for
Pakistan, it is not clear that China has gained anything from Pakistan’s indebtedness.
In February 2019 Lagarde announced that the IMF had moved closer to finalizing the
terms of a loan to Pakistan. She said that IMF financial assistance came with the expectation that
Pakistan would “restore the resilience of its economy and lay the foundations for stronger and

113

Venkatachalam, K.S. “Can Pakistan Afford CPEC?” The Diplomat, June 16, 2017,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/can-pakistan-afford-cpec/. Accessed February 7, 2019.
114
Venkatachalam.
115
Nakhoda, Aadil. “Pakistan ranked 8th in size of trade deficit.” The Express Tribune, October 29, 2018.
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1836177/2-pakistan-ranked-8th-size-trade-deficit/. Accessed February 15, 2019.
116
Zumbrun and Vaishampayan.

44

more inclusive growth.”117 The IMF has not explicitly referenced CPEC in any of its public
statements on Pakistan’s debt crisis.
Pakistan has made no moves to completely back out of the BRI. Yet Khan has pushed
back on certain CPEC projects, signifying he is more distrustful of China’s promises than his
predecessor. For example, the Pakistani government officially cancelled plans for a $2 BN coal
plant that was intended to be built in Punjab Province. But while an official from Khan’s
administration called certain projects “expensive and not necessary” he also emphasized that this
would allow Pakistan to “focus on our priorities, including the development of Gwadar port and
the western route of CPEC, which connects the hinterlands of Baluchistan and KhyberPakhtunkhwa provinces.”118 Ultimately, a $2 BN coal plant is a drop in the bucket of the broader
CPEC. Though Khan has pledged to review the terms and financial validity of all CPEC projects,
for the time being the vast majority are going to continue as planned. In November, Khan made
an official visit to China after which the two countries issued a join-statement. An excerpt from
the statement reads: “Both [China and Pakistan] reaffirmed their commitment to CPEC and
agreed that it was a win-win enterprise for entire region and would bring regional prosperity and
development through enhanced connectivity. […] Both sides dismissed the growing negative
propaganda against CPEC and expressed determination to safeguard the CPEC projects from all
threats.”119 Whatever criticism Khan directed at China during his campaign seems to have been
mollified. And with the IMF and Saudi Arabia’s help, Pakistan should be able to pay back its
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creditors. But CPEC still must prove itself to the Pakistani public. In addition to rising debts,
there are concerns in Pakistan that CPEC will line the pockets of Pakistan and China’s elite while
delivering minimal benefits to the rest of the nation. The recent disclosure that Khan awarded a
CPEC contract to a company owned by one of his closest advisors set off alarm bells in Pakistan
that the project was a familiar story of state-backed corruption.120

Threat of Violent Resistance

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has not just faced economic hurdles. It has raised
tensions in China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region and Pakistan’s Balochistan Province, both of
which have histories of unrest. Yet the CCP’s treatment of Xinjiang has drawn increased
international attention in recent months. Troubling reports have emerged of a security crackdown
including detention camps for Uighurs, an ethnic minority group of Turkish Muslims. Reasons
for the campaign to persecute the Uighurs are two-fold. First, the CCP is seeking to prevent
another domestic insurgency. Uighurs have agitated for independence in the past, sometimes
violently. In line with its One China policy, Beijing is firmly against allowing Xinjiang to secede
from the Mainland. The second reason to clamp down so aggressively on any disturbance is to
protect the success of BRI. As China’s western-most province, Xinjiang Autonomous Region is
a cornerstone for several of the land-based routes. CPEC is particularly at risk since it begins in
the Xinjiang city of Kashgar.
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China’s security crackdown in Xinjiang is causing more issues than just bad press for
CPEC. The detention centers and surveillance apparatus are costing the CCP. According to The
Financial Times, China spent close to $200 BN on domestic security in 2017, up from $100 BN
in 2011.121 Additionally, sending hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of Uighurs to detention
camps is causing a labor shortage in the region.122 The CCP has responded by stepping up its
state-backed migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang, but this is a short-term solution that may
worsen ethnic relations in the future. Finally, the oppression of Muslims has made Islamist terror
groups elsewhere turn their attention to China. Both the Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliated
groups have called out China’s treatment of its Muslim minority as a cause for jihad.123
Moreover, before China placed a travel ban on Uighurs, several thousand emigrated to Syria to
join terrorist groups.124 CPEC and other BRI projects in Xinjiang are at great security risk should
radicalized Uighurs return.
There is a similar concern about domestic violence against CPEC in Pakistan’s
Balochistan Province. The Pakistani government has faced resistance from Baloch nationalist
rebels for decades. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is the largest of several groups in
Balochistan that has intensified its demands for Baloch independence in response to CPEC.125
The former commander of the BLA, Aslam Baloch, was quoted in Pakistani media reports as

121

Feng, Emily. “Crackdown in Xinjiang: Where have all the people gone?” Financial Times, August 5, 2018.
https://www.ft.com/content/ac0ffb2e-8b36-11e8-b18d-0181731a0340. Accessed March 20, 2019.
122
Feng; Cumming-Bruce, Nick. “U.S. Steps Up Criticism of China for Detentions in Xinjiang.” The New York
Times, March 13, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/world/asia/china-muslim-xinjiang.html. Accessed
March 24, 2019.
123
Aslam, Sabah. “Countering Terrorism and the dawn of CPEC.” Modern Diplomacy, March 18, 2019.
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/03/18/countering-terrorism-and-the-dawn-of-cpec/. Accessed March 24, 2019.
124
Hope, Joseph. “Returning Uighur Fighters and China’s National Security Dilemma.” The Jamestown Foundation,
Vol. 18, No. 13. July 25, 2018. Accessed via https://jamestown.org/program/returning-uighur-fighters-and-chinasnational-security-dilemma/. Accessed March 20, 2019.
125
Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. “Balochistan: China's achilles hill.” The Economic Times, February 26, 2019.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/balochistan-chinas-achilles-hill/articleshow/68163847.cms.
Accessed March 12, 2019.

47

saying that “China is looting resources in Balochistan in the name of mega projects by calling it
the CPEC.”126 He also accused China of making Balochistan more “volatile” and joining
Pakistan as a “partner-in-crime.”127 This attitude has resulted in serious security consequences
for CPEC, jeopardizing its key project, the Gwadar Port.
As with other local communities living among BRI projects, some Balochi peoples are
concerned that they will not reap any rewards. One specific source of unease stems from the
demographic realities of the CPEC, and particularly the development of the Gwadar Port. One
report predicts that by 2048, Chinese immigrants will outnumber Pakistanis in Balochistan.128
There is also a concern that an influx of Pakistanis from other regions will further dilute the
ethnic Baloch population.129 Furthermore, economic inequality and exploitation of natural
resources have caused tensions between Balochistan and the Pakistani government for decades.
So CPEC is adding fuel to the fire, so to speak. A 2017 United Nations report echoed concerns
from Baloch nationalists that CPEC could represent a threat to their existence. The report states:
“The resulting resettlements [from CPEC] would reduce local population into an ‘economically
subservient minority’. Marginalisation [sic] of local population groups could re-ignite separatist
movements and toughen military response from the Government.”130 In March, 2019
demonstrations were held in Balochistan calling on the United Nations to investigate Pakistan for
human rights abuses against activists in the region. One of the leaders of the protests was
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recorded as calling on the UN to “stop CPEC - because it is a death sentence for Baloch
people.”131 Finally, there is a growing concern that Pakistan will imitate China’s brutal tactics in
Xinjiang to quash the Balochi separatist movement.132
For the most part, violent resistance against Chinese nationals has only manifested in
rare, isolated incidents. In 2017, a Chinese couple were kidnapped from Quetta, the capital of
Balochistan, where they were teachers. They were later found murdered, and the terrorist group
the Islamic State claimed responsibility. Though this incident was not directly related to CPEC—
later reports suggested that the couple were Christian missionaries, which may explain why they
were targeted by the Islamic militant group—it did represent the growing danger that Chinese
nationals were facing as their numbers increased in the unstable region.133 In August 2018, a
suicide bomber from the BLA targeted a bus transporting Chinese engineers, though there were
no fatalities. The situation intensified in November 2018, however, when the BLA attacked the
Chinese consulate in Karachi. Four people were killed though none were consulate workers. This
attack was notable not only because it was leveled against government officials, but also because
it happened outside of Balochistan, in Sindh province. It demonstrated that Balochi rebels were
ready to display their opposition to CPEC throughout Pakistan and not just in Balochistan.
Up until the time of writing, China had not made any major changes to how it handles
security for projects in Balochistan or Pakistan at large. The PRC has issued travel warnings for
Balochistan and beefed up private security details but has not done much else.134 Part of the
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reason for this muted response is because China is limited in what it can do within Pakistan’s
borders. In a demonstration of the Pakistani government’s own interest in CPEC’s success in the
wake of the attack in Karachi, it has set up a new military division with over 15,000 employees
to protect CPEC projects.135 But there is growing concern—which extends beyond Balochistan
and CPEC—that Pakistan is unable (or unwilling) to contain extremism within its borders. After
all, this is one of the primary reasons the United States decreased foreign aid to Pakistan in
2018.136 Yet there is some evidence that Baloch resistance has brought China to the negotiating
table. Unconfirmed reports have surfaced that Chinese officials have unsuccessfully met with
Baloch rebels to appease their concerns.137
There are additional international dimensions to the unrest in Balochistan which may
hinder the CPEC. The rise in Balochi violence has aggravated tensions among Pakistan, India,
Afghanistan, and the United States. The Pakistani government blames India for covertly agitating
the situation in Balochistan, in order to sabotage CPEC and undermine Pakistani sovereignty.138
The recent upswing in Balochi attacks has caused the recurrence of arguments that India is
funding extremist training camps in Afghanistan.139 As the following section will expand on, the
CPEC is already a source of conflict and competition between Pakistan and India. Any additional
anxieties could induce greater hostilities between the nuclear powers. Finally, the United States

135

Basit, Abdul. “Attacks on Chinese nationals and interests in Pakistan are likely to continue. Here’s why.” South
China Morning Post, November 27, 2018. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2175238/attackschinese-nationals-and-interests-pakistan-are-likely. Accessed March 24, 2019.
136
Stewart, Phil and Idrees Ali. “Exclusive: Pentagon cancels aid to Pakistan over record on militants.” Reuters,
September 1, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pakistan-military-exclusive/exclusive-pentagon-cancelsaid-to-pakistan-over-record-on-militants-idUSKCN1LH3TA. Accessed March 25, 2019.
137
Notezai, Muhammed Akbar. “Why Balochs are Targeting China.” The Diplomat, November 26, 2018,
https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/why-balochs-are-targeting-china/. Accessed March 16, 2019.
138
Shahid, Usnan. “Balochistan: The Troubled Heart of CPEC.” The Diplomat, August 23, 2016.
https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/balochistan-the-troubled-heart-of-the-cpec/. Accessed March 17, 2019.
139
Shahid.

50

has expressed displeasure with the human rights situation in Balochistan, adding ammunition to
American arguments that partnering with China imperils the wellbeing of BRI host countries.140

India’s Response

CPEC has already increased stress in the relationship between Pakistan and India, a
situation which is sure to hamper China’s ambitions. CPEC works against several of India’s
objectives. The Belt and Road Initiative signifies China’s rising economic and geopolitical
influence in the region, and its emphasis on Pakistan and the CPEC undoes decades of India’s
work to isolate Pakistan. Thus because of CPEC, India must contend with two of its regional
competitors gaining strength and potentially partnering against it. India has joined the United
States and other BRI detractors warning recipient countries that the project is a debt trap. This
attitude is not for want of China’s trying to coax India into joining Belt and Road. Though India
rejected China’s 2017 invitation to the first Belt and Road Forum, President Xi Jinping has made
clear he has not given up on convincing India to attend the second, scheduled for April, 2019.141
From the beginning, India was one of the staunchest critics of Belt and Road. To counter
China’s ballooning economic influence in the region, India has launched a series of projects. In
the Himalayas, India is building a series of railroads linking India with Nepal and Bhutan. This
comes as China is building its own Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor, the Himalayan
counterpart to the CPEC.142 To counter the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, India has stepped
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up its support of small island nations in the Indian Ocean. In February 2019, India announced it
would give $361 MN in aid to the Maldives, a 400% increase from 2018.143 Finally, India has
pursued partnerships with Japan. The two countries revealed plans for the Asia-Africa Growth
Corridor in 2016, a clear response to BRI’s extension into Africa. So far, none of India’s
initiatives presents a real challenge to the success of BRI. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor has
yet to break ground, and India has struggled to complete its work in the Himalayas due to the
region’s challenging terrain.144
In a direct response to CPEC, India gained control of a port in the Iranian city of
Chabahar, merely 50 miles from Gwadar.145 The port is intended to facilitate trade among India,
Afghanistan, and Iran, particularly for oil. In addition to the port itself, India and Iran are
planning on building a network of highways to connect Chabahar to Afghanistan.146 Chabahar
also allows for India to bypass Pakistan, which has blocked Indian goods from traveling through
its borders, thereby denying access to Iran and Afghanistan in the past. The Chabahar Port faces
many of the same challenges as Gwadar: threat of extremist resistance, geopolitical tensions, and
financial concerns. The project was almost halted when the United States ratcheted up sanctions
against Iran, though they eventually granted an exception for continued development of
Chabahar. Though many see Chabahar in direct competition with Gwadar, it is important to note
that Beijing and Tehran have close economic and military ties. There are reports that Iran has
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invited China and Pakistan to join the Chabahar project, to India’s chagrin.147 For the time being,
Chabahar has not caused any known change in strategy for CPEC or the BRI more broadly. It
will take years for the Chabahar to become fully operational and China has to contend with a
viable threat to the success of Gwadar.
One of the key sticking points for India with regards to the CPEC is its route through the
disputed Kashmir Province. Kashmir is a disputed province between India, and Pakistan. India
considers Kashmir illegally occupied by Pakistan, and views CPEC in Kashmir as a further
violation of its sovereignty.148 There is historic precedent for India’s distaste for China’s
presence in Kashmir; the disagreement extends back to 1962, when China and India went to war
over a border dispute. Yet China maintains that CPEC is a wholly economic project with no
intentions to meddle in the territorial debate. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang was reported as
saying, “as for the dispute of Kashmir, China's position remained unchanged. Also, CPEC has no
relationship with the dispute in certain regions...if India wants to take part in the OBOR, there
are many channels and ways.”149 Yet there are conflicting reports that China is planning to send
30,000 military personnel to secure its projects in Kashmir, which are exacerbating India’s worry
that CPEC represents a direct threat to its national security.150 The same 2017 UN report which
warned about rising tensions due to CPEC in Balochistan also cautioned that CPEC could further
destabilize the situation in Kashmir.151
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The first months of 2019 witnessed just how easily tensions between India and Pakistan
over Kashmir could flare up and become armed conflict. In February, Pakistani terror group
Jaish-E-Mohammed (JeM) conducted a suicide bombing in Kashmir in which over 40 Indian
officers were killed. The situation quickly escalated as both Pakistan and India conducted air
strikes against each other. After a couple tense weeks, hostilities cooled when Pakistan returned a
captured Indian pilot. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a statement urging “both
Pakistan and India to exercise restraint and peacefully resolve their differences through
dialogue.”152 Yet China still staunchly defended Pakistan by vetoing a Security Council
Resolution presented by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom condemning JeM as
a terrorist group. This vote did not represent a change in China’s policy towards Pakistan—
China had blocked three identical resolutions condemning JeM in the past—but it did signal that
icy relations between China and India are unlikely to resolve anytime soon. In response to the
vote on social media, many Indians called for a boycott of Chinese goods.153 At the time of
writing, there is no evidence to suggest that the bombing in Kashmir was related to the CPEC, or
that CPEC played any role in the subsequent brawl. Rather, the recent events demonstrate how
precarious China’s investments may be, given the instability of Kashmir and relations between
India and Pakistan. India’s willingness (and ability) to conduct airstrikes on Pakistani soil puts
Chinese projects there in direct line of fire. It seems unlikely that China will be able to insure
against this risk in the future. Furthermore, China’s continued support of Pakistan throughout the
ordeal may make India even more concerned about China’s increasing presence in South Asia.
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Finally, the recent events in Kashmir have further hindered China’s efforts to bring India on as a
collaborator in CPEC and BRI. As recently as January, 2019 President Xi was planning a visit to
New Delhi to improve relations between the countries.154 Given renewed pressure on Prime
Minister Modi to stand up to Pakistan, it seems more unlikely than ever that he will pursue an
economic stake in CPEC or Belt and Road.

Pakistan Case Study - Conclusion

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is Belt and Road’s most ambitious project. With
highways, energy pipelines, sea ports, cultural exchange initiatives, and more, it includes an
example of just about every piece of Belt and Road that China hopes to accomplish elsewhere.
CPEC’s success is crucial to the success of the broader project, and its progress serves as a
forecast for the rest of the Initiative. For other nations considering joining BRI, CPEC has many
attractive features. Pakistan is getting billions of dollars invested in critical connective
infrastructure and many projects are already up and running. The swift nature of CPEC cannot be
overemphasized. Even so, there are legitimate concerns that CPEC will ultimately serve China to
a far greater extent than it will serve Pakistan. The fact that Imran Khan seems to have changed
his position on the value of CPEC is not necessarily reassuring to BRI skeptics who believe
China is facilitating corruption so that its projects will survive.
In attempting to assess whether CPEC—and the rest of BRI—is likely to succeed, it
seems that the greatest threats to its completion are from geopolitical factors somewhat out of
China’s control. The flare up in tensions between Pakistan and India in early 2019 brought the
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future of CPEC to the brink of disaster. The fate of the CPEC relies on stability in Xinjiang,
Kashmir, and Balochistan, regions which are geopolitical tinderboxes. Unrest or violence from
local communities in these regions seem like a larger threat to CPEC’s success than actions on
the part of India, the United States, or Japan. While these three countries have made some
attempts to provide alternative investment opportunities for other countries in the region, no
viable competitor to CPEC has arisen. Even the Chabahar Port in Iran will take years to catch up
to Gwadar’s progress.
So far, there is no evidence that CPEC has directly contributed to a broader economic
statecraft agenda on the part of the CCP. If anything, China’s overtures to CPEC’s critics,
including Balochi nationalists and India, demonstrate that the CCP is willing to modify its
policies to guarantee CPEC’s success. This is not to say that there are no geopolitically strategic
elements to CPEC. Gwadar’s position on the Indian Ocean, the increased connectivity to the
Middle East, and a tighter foothold in Kashmir all serve Chinese (and Pakistani) national security
interests. Still, China is exposing itself to great national security risks as already described in
Xinjiang, Balochistan, and Kashmir. Though there has been much fanfare in the American and
Indian medias over the Gwadar Port’s naval advantages, there is no evidence yet that China has
any military intentions there. Given China and Pakistan’s history of friendly relations, CPEC is
not an ideal example to those who want to paint BRI as an entirely geopolitical power play. The
following chapter, however, examines China’s rapidly growing influence in a country much
farther from its borders: Kenya.
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Chapter III
Kenya Case Study

In Kenya, China finds itself much farther from its shores and in direct competition with
the United States and other Western powers for the role of regional leader of economic
development. While Pakistan is an obviously logical choice for Belt and Road investment, it is
less immediately apparent why China is directing the BRI into Africa. Though China has had
diplomatic relations with many African nations since they gained independence from colonial
powers, in the 21st Century the CCP has focused its foreign policy in Africa on building
economic ties.155 Some view the BRI in Africa as counter intuitive since it does not directly
connect to the SREB or the MSR. Yet the BRI in Kenya is not so different from its equivalent in
Pakistan. The focus is on building connective infrastructure such as railroads and highways,
which China claims will benefit both countries equally. Many of the challenges that were seen in
Pakistan are also getting reported in Kenya. Namely, concerns over mounting Kenyan debts to
Chinese creditors, questions over the real value-add these projects are bringing to Kenya, and
geopolitical concerns that loans will make Kenya politically indebted to China. A shallower
historical relationship between Kenya and China and the vast cultural differences between the
countries have added another dimension challenging the BRI’s success in the country. Given
China’s newly increased presence in Kenya, discontent over the influx of Chinese workers into
the country is much more pronounced than in Pakistan. There seems to be much more widelyheld skepticism among Kenyans about the BRI more broadly than there is in Pakistan.
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Finally, BRI’s push into Africa has given new life to the debates surrounding the best
models for development on the continent. Countries such as Kenya have struggled for decades to
recover from their colonial pasts and achieve sustainable, long-term economic growth. For
decades the United States was the largest player both in terms of FDI and foreign aid in Africa.
While many in Kenya see China as a welcome change in the status quo, equally many worry
whether Chinese investment will undo decades of work to establish good governance in the
country and region.156 In 2016, pan-African research organization Afrobarometer conducted a
continent-wide survey of 36 African countries, attempting to gauge public opinion on Chinese
involvement. Thirty percent of all respondents said that the United States offered the best model
for international development, while 24% picked China.157 In Kenya, however, almost 50%
preferred the United States and less than a quarter selected China. In terms of general influence,
the United States and China were basically tied both in the larger dataset and in Kenya. But when
asked about specific economic influence, 75% of Kenyans noted that China exerted “a lot” of
economic influence. These results have to be considered in a vacuum, since there are no previous
or later studies to demonstrate whether there has been a change of attitude since BRI launched on
the continent. Even so, they demonstrate that China is catching up to the United States in the
court of public opinion.
Belt and Road projects in Kenya are of a far smaller scale than the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor. Even so, according to researchers at Johns Hopkins, in the years since the
BRI was announced FDI from China to Kenya increased over 250% (from $79 MN to over $280
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MN).158 In the same period, United States’ FDI to Kenya decreased by over 50%.159 Thus while
Kenya is of relatively low importance to the broader BRI project, the BRI has the potential to
make a large impact on Kenya. The landmark BRI project in Kenya is the Standard Gauge
Railway. Though there are other projects, including a $170 MN network of highways
surrounding Mombasa, the SGR is the most ambitious and potentially impactful venture.160 As
the following section will demonstrate, the Standard Gauge Railway is a source of contention in
Kenya, despite promises from the Chinese that it signals a new age of opportunity for the
country.

The Standard Gauge Railway

In 2008 then President of Kenya Mwai Kibaki launched the Vision 2030 Campaign.
According to its website, the campaign “aims to transform Kenya into a newly industrializing,
middle-income country providing a high quality of life to all its citizens by 2030.”161 Welcoming
BRI investment was a natural outgrowth of this broader strategy, especially given a trend of
declining FDI from the U.S. in the early 21st century.162 China broke ground on phase one of the
Standard Gauge Railway before BRI’s inception, but it is now considered a BRI project. The
symbolic nature of this project cannot be ignored. The Chinese-built SGR will replace a railway
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built by British colonialists, which was known in Kenya as a “monumental folly.”163 The
symbolism is not lost on Kenyans. As one article explained, President Uhuru Kenyatta
“christened the new line the ‘Madaraka Express’, named after the June 1 holiday that marks the
day in 1964 Kenya won self-governance from Britain ahead of full independence.”164 Yet while
President Kenyatta celebrates the new and improved SGR, many voices within Kenya fear that
they are welcoming a new colonial power: China.
Construction of the Railway is divided into three phases. The first stretches over 300
miles from the port city of Mombasa to Nairobi, Kenya’s capital. Phase I opened for business in
May, 2017. Phase II is underway and intends to connect Nairobi to the town of Naivasha. The 75
miles of new track are expected to be completed three months ahead of schedule, in September,
2019.165 The final phase will extend to Kisumu, a port city on Lake Victoria and then to Malaba,
on the border with Uganda. China is concurrently funding an SGR line in Uganda, originating in
Kampala, which will eventually connect with the Kenyan SGR. The final product will include
over 800 miles of track, allowing goods and passengers to travel between Mombasa and
Kampala in a single day.
Kenya and China have broader ambitions with the SGR that resemble other BRI projects
such as the Gwadar Port. China hopes that Mombasa will serve as a “trade gateway” to East
Africa, with SGR lines eventually extending into Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Ethiopia, Burundi, and South Sudan.166 The criticism surrounding China’s plans for
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Mombasa also echo that of Gwadar. Many warn that China is laying the foundation for a second
military base on the Indian Ocean to follow the existing base in Djibouti.

Figure 3: The Standard Gauge Railway

Source: Reuters167

Domestic Resistance in Kenya to BRI

Financing for the SGR is standard for BRI projects. The first phase cost $3.2 BN, 90% of
which was loaned by the Export-Import Bank of China. The value of Phase I is in question,
however, given that reports have arisen that Phase I ended up costing four times the original
estimate, making the final price on par with a railway in Ethiopia that was 150 miles longer and
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electrified.168 The high costs were originally justified by officials claiming that the new SGR
would increase GDP by 1.5%.169 But the railway was underused in 2018, generating less than
half of the revenues that feasibility studies had predicted.170 The railway is getting paid for by
high taxes and an agreement that a Chinese company operate the railway for the next ten years.
The rest of the railway is supposed to cost $3.8 BN. At the Forum for Africa-China Cooperation
in September 2018, President Kenyatta requested that China grant half the cost and loan the
rest.171 This bid stemmed from growing domestic discomfort in Kenya at the level of
indebtedness to China. President Xi did not immediately approve the grant, instead mandating
that further negotiations would have to be held to ensure that Chinese firms reaped enough
benefits to cover the costs.
It seems that in Kenya, to a greater extent than in Pakistan, there is a growing divide
between political elites and the Kenyan population on the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s
increased role in Kenya has stirred intense debates among economists within and outside Kenya
about whether the BRI will bring sustainable economic development. As elsewhere, the largest
red flag is the level of debt. As previously mentioned, Kenya requested more Chinese loans at
the most recent FOCAC meeting, even though Moody’s had downgraded Kenya’s credit rating
to a B2 in early 2018. With public debt surpassing $50 BN, Kenya has become the 5th most
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indebted country in Africa.172 Total debt now equals around 60% of the country’s GDP.173 China
is the nation’s largest bilateral creditor. As of 2018, Kenya owes 72% of its bilateral debt and
21% of its overall debt to China.174
The level of indebtedness has also set off alarms about potential risks to Kenyan
sovereignty. In January, revelations about BRI contracts were made that seemed to suggest that
the port in Mombasa was being held as collateral for SGR loans. In December 2018 a Kenyan
newspaper leaked a damning report which seemed to say that when contracts were drawn up in
2014, the Mombasa Port was listed as collateral for the loans. The Kenyan Auditor-General flatly
denied these accusations in December stating that “any reports that from my office are taken to
Parliament. A report picked from the social media is not official.”175 The new revelations set off
alarm bells throughout Kenya and the rest of East Africa as it seemed to confirm the worst
suspicions about BRI. President Kenyatta has called accusations that he imperiled Kenyan
sovereignty “propaganda,” emphasizing that “we [Kenyans] are ahead of our payment schedule
for the SGR loan and there is no cause for alarm.”176 Chinese officials also denied the reports,
staunchly maintaining that “the allegation that Kenyan side used the Mombasa Port as a
collateral in its payment agreement with the Chinese financial institution for the Mombasa-
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Nairobi railway is not true.”177 But in January, another journalist got ahold of what he claimed
were the contracts and printed the language verbatim in Kenyan newspaper, The Daily Nation.
The report quoted leaked BRI contracts as saying “Neither the borrower (Kenya) nor any of its
assets is entitled to any right of immunity on the grounds of sovereignty or otherwise from
arbitration, suit, execution or any other legal process with respect to its obligations under this
Agreement.”178 The contracts as reported in The Daily Nation also required that any
disagreement arising from the loan be arbitrated in Beijing through the China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, rather than through an independent mediator.179
Though Kenyan and Chinese officials continue to deny that there was anything unusual or
nefarious in the contracts, members of Kenya’s parliament are opening an investigation into the
proceedings. It is reported that the investigating committee “will not allow the country’s assets to
be owned by the Chinese as in the case of Zambia and Sri Lanka.”180 Surely this investigation
will be closely watched in Kenya and China, as the results could have large implications for the
future of BRI on the continent.
Long before the salient reports on Mombasa were released many Kenyans were skeptical
of a project which they saw as disproportionately beneficial to the Chinese. Displeasure with
China is widespread in Kenya, particularly over concerns that Chinese construction firms will not
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hire Kenyan labor. The Kenyan parliament claims that there are 2,679 Kenyans working on the
SGR compared to 841 Chinese and that by 2027 100% of the staff will be Kenyan.181 But Kenyans
have responded to these defenses with complaints that Chinese workers hold a majority of upperlevel positions. The focus on employment is hardly surprising given that the BRI is unfolding
during a youth unemployment crisis in Kenya. Current youth unemployment stands at 22%, and
many Kenyans place the blame on the influx of Chinese investment.182
Part of the unemployment challenge is that there is mutual distrust between Kenyan and
Chinese workers. Both sides have accused the other of racism and intolerance. In the case of
Kenyan workers, there is growing concern that Chinese project managers are inhibiting the
transfer of skills that would eventually allow Kenyans to take the reigns. Sun Baohong, the
Chinese Ambassador to Kenya, attributed the delay in redistributing jobs to Kenyans to a
language barrier.183 This explanation however, is competing with accounts of abuse at the hands
of Chinese managers. In a widely-read New York Times piece published in October 2018,
Kenyans described Chinese supervisors who directed racial slurs towards their Kenyan
employees.184 Furthermore, Kenyan workers interviewed in the article accused their bosses of
barring them from operating trains, unless a journalist is there to capture the moment.
Racial tensions reached a fever pitch when China staged a skit on its state-run television
network to celebrate the opening of the Standard-Gauge Railway as part of a Lunar New Year
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gala.185 In the skit set in Kenya, Chinese actors acted as Africans wearing blackface, exaggerated
body parts, and carrying baskets of fruit on their heads. Particularly offensive was the inclusion
of actors in monkey-suits; some believe these actors were actually African, though these reports
are unconfirmed. The content of the sketch was similarly off-color to the presentation. The
sketch followed an 18-year old “African” girl as she escapes an arranged marriage to study in
Beijing. The girl’s mother eventually exclaims “I love Chinese people. I love China.” The skit
was aired to 800 million viewers.
Africans in and outside of China were incensed. Naturally, Chinese officials vehemently
denied any wrongdoing and blamed the scandal on misinterpretation. China was quick to censor
any criticism voiced on popular social media networks WeChat and Weibo. A Kenyan student
was quoted in The Daily Nation saying “The scenes in the skit depicting Kenya in racist
derogatory impressions add to the obscurity of whether Kenya is truly a valuable trade partner to
China or is just another cow they are milking. […] I am convinced that China holds Kenya and
Kenyans in very low regard to the extent of consciously using universally accepted racist
impressions to depict Kenya.”186 Clearly, the skit exacerbated concerns that BRI projects were
neocolonial in nature. There was (and remains) a feeling that racism among the Chinese was to
be expected and that the real offender is the Kenyan government who welcomed Chinese money
without taking into account the impact on Kenyan welfare. A Kenyan human rights lawyer was
quoted in The New York Times sharply rebuking his government: “What is disgusting is that we
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won’t hear any official complaint from African governments who are complicit in the
recolonization of Africa by China.”187
Another source of tension dividing Kenyans is the concern over potential negative
environmental impacts of China’s projects. Plans for the SGR require it to pass through national
parks and wildlife sanctuaries in Kenya. Environmental activists were unsuccessful in stopping
Phase I of the SGR from cutting through Tsavo National Park, and it seems unlikely they will
succeed in preventing Phase II from traversing Nairobi National Park.188 In 2017, Kenya’s
National Environmental Tribunal ordered companies to cease construction of the SGR until a full
environmental impact report was completed but Kenyan and Chinese firms ignored the
directive.189 The effects of rapid construction are already being felt. The Senior Warden for
Nairobi National Park reported in February, 2019 that the park had shrunk by 580 acres due to
the SGR.190 Critiquing Chinese companies for lax environmental standards is nothing new. But
Kenya similarly has a history of environmental destruction in the name of economic
development. The seeming disregard for Kenya’s rich and diverse natural landscape is
reinforcing concerns that China is no different from the colonial powers of Kenya’s past.
Responding to these challenges, China has focused efforts on cultural exchanges among
China and African countries hosting the BRI. One controversial example, is the spread of
Confucius Institutes. These predate the BRI, but they have proliferated in recent years. Confucius
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Institutes are government-sponsored educational centers meant to spread understanding of
Chinese language and culture. Many countries, particularly the United States, warn that
Confucius Institutes are a propaganda arm for the CPC. Thought the current number of
Confucius Institutes in Africa is 48, far lower than France’s 130 cultural institutes.191 China has
also helped develop Mandarin programs across the continent. In Kenya, Mandarin will be
offered to elementary school students beginning in 2020. Additionally, China has ramped up its
scholarships to Kenyan students to attend university in China. Between 2003 and 2015 the
number of African students attending university in China increased from 2,000 to 50,000 making
China a more popular destination for these international students than the United States.192 Other
cultural exchange intiatives include a “Chinese Spring Festival Gala” held at the University of
Nairobi in March, 2018. The Gala was presented as an opportunity to introduce Kenyans to
traditional Chinese culture. It is difficult to gauge the impact these programs will have on BRI’s
success in Kenya. They do demonstrate, however, China’s concerted effort to brand themselves
as a benign power.

American Response

As previously noted, the United States has been vocal and ardent in its warnings against
the Belt and Road Initiative. Its ability to respond is constrained by an electorate less inclined to
interfere abroad, a widening economic deficit, and a President who has focused his policy
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towards China on generating a trade war and going after Huawei. Even so, the foundation for a
coordinated response to the BRI in Africa has taken shape. While the United States is certainly
on notice regarding the CPEC and the BRI in other regions, it seems that special attention is
getting paid to developments in Africa. One reason may be that the United States has
traditionally had a large economic influence in sub-Saharan Africa, especially compared to
China. Yet with BRI as part of a broader push by China to strengthen ties to African nations, the
tides are beginning to turn in China’s favor, to the great displeasure of U.S. policymakers.
Moreover, some American foreign policy analysts see African nations as particularly susceptible
to Chinese influence. An analyst at The Heritage Foundation succinctly captured this view when
he wrote: “Chinese interference in African countries’ domestic affairs frequently advances
illiberal goals opposed to U.S. interests that are also detrimental to most Africans, and its
meddling is likely to continue and be effective.”193 With this being the attitude adopted by many
in the U.S. government, a series of initiatives have recently launched to counter China’s growing
role in Africa.
In March, 2018 the U.S. Congress’ Foreign Affairs Committee hosted a hearing before
the subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations entitled “China in Africa: The New Colonialism?”194 Though the reports prepared
for the hearing are clearly intending to cast China in a nefarious light, they do offer helpful
insights into how American policymakers view Africa’s budding relationship with China as well
as some of the initial impacts. In the opening statements, Committee Chairman Christopher
Smith, a congressman from New Jersey, called BRI “designed to benefit China and, ultimately,
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help it project power.”195 Using the Confucius Institutes as evidence he further stated that
“whereas the U.S. emphasizes good governance, it suits China’s interest to train its partners in
old-style Leninism.”196 Representative Smith argued that Kenya had already demonstrated the
harm of being indebted to China when they raised import taxes to pay for the Standard Gauge
Railway. These raised taxes also affected the price and availability of HIV/AIDs medication
among other “lifesaving commodities.”197 There is a clear consensus from the nearly 100 pages
of testimony: China has imperial ambitions in Africa which are a direct threat to the economic,
security, and ideological interests of the United States.
In a testament to the unease that Belt and Road has caused to American legislators, the
U.S. House and Senate recently passed legislation to boost economic development ventures
abroad. The bipartisan Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act
was passed in October, 2018 to “facilitate the participation of private sector capital and skills in
the economic development of countries with low- or lower-middle-income economies.”198 The
Act creates a new development finance institution (called the USIDFC) which will complement
and expand on OPIC, the existing American international development financing institution. The
new USIDFC has more than double OPIC’s budget for investments, does not require borrowers
to use U.S. investors, and will be able to make equity investments.199 In short, the BUILD Act is
the United States’ free-market response to Belt and Road. The legislation also represents a
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dramatic change from the foreign policy President Trump campaigned on. As part of his dual
promise to cut foreign aid and be less interventionist, reports surfaced early in his tenure that
Trump was considering cutting OPIC altogether.200 Less than two years later, the United States
had formed a companion to OPIC, increasing the amount of money it would invest abroad. The
USIDFC will have a global portfolio, not specific to Africa or Kenya. But shortly after BUILD
was signed, National Security Advisor John Bolton launched the “Prosper Africa Initiative,”
demonstrating that the United States is uniquely focused on countering China’s influence there.
Few details have emerged about the Prosper Africa Initiative in the months since it was
announced. No specific goals have been outlined other than promising to increase unilateral
investment in the continent by an unspecified amount. Response to the Initiative has been mixed
both in the U.S. and in African nations. Many policy analysts applauded the Trump
Administration for providing an alternative to BRI on the continent and focusing American
attention (and dollars) on Africa, a region that is not typically a U.S. priority.201 A Brookings
Fellow specializing in Africa called it “one of the most business-friendly US-Africa policies in
recent times.”202 Yet Prosper Africa’s messaging was muddled by Bolton’s threat to cease
funding for United Nations peacekeeping missions on the continent.203 Additionally, in the most
recent budget proposal the Trump Administration indicated they would cut aid to many African
countries. Aid for Kenya is slated to get slashed by over 60%, including cuts to programs
200
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intended to stop the spread of HIV/AIDs.204 This is only a preliminary budget proposal, and
many American lawmakers signaled they would not support a bill with such drastic cuts to
foreign aid. Even so, the mixed messages do not help make the United States seem like it is
waging a legitimate challenge to Belt and Road in Africa. As a former foreign policy advisor to
President Obama put it, ““Washington needs to understand that China is investing in
relationships, not just infrastructure.”205

Kenya Case Study - Conclusion

Kenya makes is a much smaller part of Belt and Road than Pakistan. Yet in some ways,
the Initiative’s success (or failure) there has larger implications. Critics see the BRI in Kenya as
a neocolonial venture. They warn that through partnering with China, Kenya is descending on a
slippery slope that will end in corruption, reduced governance standards, and a population
indoctrinated to support the CCP. At the same time, others view the BRI as an opportunity to
fund critical infrastructure in Kenya during a time when the United States and other Western
lenders have pulled back on their international development programs. Moreover, the BRI seems
to have motivated the United States to refocus its attention on development in Africa.
BRI’s first project in Kenya, the Standard Gauge Railway, debuted with mixed results.
There are well-founded concerns over the economic value of the project. Though a definitive
answer to whether the railroad is worth the cost will not be available until it is completed.
Though Chinese projects are not at any direct threat of violence as in Pakistan, it is clear that

204

Kelley, Kevin J. “Trump's proposed budget slashes funding to Kenya.” The Citizen, March 13, 2019.
https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Trump-s-proposed-budget-slashes-funding-to-Kenya/1840386-5023112ufnxr4z/index.html. Accessed March 24, 2019.
205
Landler and Wong.

72

China will have to work to gain the trust of Kenyans. The reports of racist incidents on
construction sites in Kenya in addition to the faux pas during the 2018 Lunar New Year TV Gala
do not help to paint China as a benign economic partner. Yet it should be noted that the United
States has had its own racist blunders with regards to Africa. President Trump famously referred
to African nations using a profane epithet. And during a tour of Kenya, Melania Trump came
under fire for her tone-deaf fashion choices, which echoed popular dress of European
colonialists.206
The academic and political conversations surrounding Belt and Road in Kenya tend to
wrongfully portray the Chinese as tricking Kenya into these contracts. When in reality Kenya has
sought out the Chinese investment and eagerly welcomed the aid. This counterview was
expressed in one of the statements presented to the U.S. Foreign Relations Committee: “It may
be convenient to argue that China's presence is neocolonial, but that fails to consider African
agency in determining the scope and scale of their relations with China. China's strategy is
rooted in its imperative to access resources and markets and to appear to be a responsible global
power. Conversely, African leaders want to use China's presence in their nations to boost their
political legitimacy both domestically and internationally.”207 Thus developing stronger ties with
China remains mutually beneficial to China and many African nations. Until the United States,
or any other country, can prove that China is causing lasting damage with the BRI, it is highly
unlikely that recipient countries in need of FDI, such as Kenya, will back out of contracts.
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Conclusion

The Belt and Road Initiative’s progress—in Pakistan, Kenya, and beyond—will continue
to be closely watched by policymakers and analysts around the world. Though news breaks
about BRI every day, the case studies in this paper provide higher level insights into BRI. The
first, is that for the time being China is committed to this project regardless of the obstacles.
Whether it is separatist violence against Chinese workers and the projects, or cold feet from
recipient countries, or challenges from other superpowers, China has remained committed to
seeing the projects through to completion. This may simply be unbridled optimism, but more
likely it suggests that China sees the continued value in BRI, despite setbacks.
Yet both Pakistan and Kenya demonstrate that there are systemic issues undermining the
success of BRI. The problem of debt sustainability looms over every BRI project, and Pakistan
and Kenya are not exceptions. Pakistan came to the brink of default when it ran to the IMF for
support. Yet in the intervening months, both the IMF and Saudi Arabia have committed to
supplying aid, signaling that CPEC will be able to continue as planned. In both Pakistan and
Kenya, work remains to be done to convince local populations that the Initiative will distribute
benefits widely. Otherwise, China runs the risk of falling out of favor with recipient countries.
Though Pakistan demonstrates that a skeptical new Prime Minister can be convinced of BRI’s
merits. Finally, there are factors working against BRI that are larger than the project itself. One is
the overall deceleration of the Chinese economy.208 Another, is the existential risk CPEC faces
should a war break out between India and Pakistan. Through BRI China is exposing itself to
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great geopolitical risk. Only time will tell whether there is a threshold of security and economic
risk China is unwilling to cross in pursuit of BRI.
Neither Pakistan nor Kenya give clean answers to the question concerning economic
statecraft. There are definite signs pointing towards a broader geopolitical strategy that China is
hoping to accomplish with BRI. In Pakistan, China’s actions in Kashmir could be seen as a
fortification of the region; the Gwadar Port is strategically placed on the Indian Ocean and could
someday be used for China’s growing naval power. Neither of these has goals has manifested
itself, however. The concerns about BRI’s impact in Kenya and Africa at large are of much
subtler methods of economic statecraft. Through the Confucius Institutes, and trapping leaders in
monumental debts, China will indoctrinate states into tacitly supporting controversial activities
such as the One China policy and the crackdown in Xinjiang. As the argument goes, if nations
move to prefer a Beijing model for development, democratic ideals and free-market policies will
be abandoned in the name of easy capital flow from Beijing. Yet the Pakistan and Kenya case
studies do not entirely support these slippery slope conclusions regarding the Belt and Road
Initiative. Neither country has ever recognized Taiwan as independent, so Belt and Road is
unlikely to produce a change in their positions on the One China policy that is more in favor of
Beijing.209 No evidence has surfaced to suggest that China has leveraged Pakistan’s or Kenya’s
BRI debts for geopolitical purposes.
Despite some countries considering renegotiating their contracts with the Chinese, overall
the BRI is poised to proceed as planned. Recent news broke that showed the BRI is even
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beginning to make headway in Western nations. On March 23, 2019, Italy became the first G7
country to join the Initiative, signing several contracts worth billions of dollars. While Italian
leaders proudly announced the plan, their counterparts in Europe and the United States warned
they were letting a “Trojan Horse” into the continent.210 Italy’s decision to join in the face of
criticism from its allies demonstrates the extent to which the BRI remains an attractive economic
prospect. Only time will tell whether or not the BRI is eventually revealed to be a nefarious
geopolitical plot. For now, countries around the globe are welcoming the Belt and Road
Initiative, defying Washington D.C. in favor of Beijing.
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